## Proofs of In-Line Functionality in SDN Networks

eResearch Conference, Queenstown Matt Stevens 7<sup>th</sup> February 2016





# What is SDN ?

It is a network architecture


### that separates the control plane from the forwarding plane

It applies to Routers and Switches that provide Layer 2 and 3 routing protocols

In-line functionality may also benefit from using the control plane

Key network benefits

- Resource optimisation enabled by the centralised view and automation. {people, capital, infrastructure}
- Ease of introducing new technologies {experimentation, updating software, no provider lock-in}



# What is NFV ?

It is a network architecture


#### that separates software from hardware using virtualization

Proprietary network hardware can be (and is) specialised for performance, but it costs.


Generic hardware is slower but can achieve higher utility, similar performance can be gained through parallelism

Key network benefits

- Resource optimisation when combined with a centralised view and automation. {people, capital, infrastructure}
- Ease of introducing new technologies
  {experimentation, updating software, no provider lock-in}
  programmable




### Firewall Middlebox as an In-Line Service




Operates on the packets it sees Manages it's own FW state Decoupled from all other elements in the network Operates at line speed (unless DPI is required) Needs limited ongoing attention from the controller

## Implementing in-line services



#### SDN In-line Services – moving the algorithm off-line (for example, FlowGuard 2014)



#### Solves 'problems' the SDN community perceives in in-line services

Global and Local Knowledge in SDN. Stevens, Ng, Welch & Streader (2015) Includes a survey of 15 recent (2014+) SDN survey papers on SDN

## **Network Invariants**

## **Provable global routing properties**

- No loops
- No black holes
- Host reachability

## **Optimisable Network properties**

- Power consumption
- Labour costs / human error
- Latency
- Hardware / capital costs
- Failure recovery time
- Software updating
- Flow capacity
- Resilience under network stress

# The Network Proving Problem

## **Provable global routing properties**

- No loops
- No black holes
- Host reachability

#### Off-line services may prompt frequent off-line proofs of the network

for example dynamic firewall changes, directly impact host reachability

#### In-line services make proving network properties difficult

- Dynamically re-route packets
- Dynamically re-write packets

# What if?


# Can in-line functionality

- be defined in terms of network properties?
- ensure no surprises?

## **Research Goals**

- 1. Contribute an implementation independent model of a class of in-line network service that provides provable deterministic properties.
- 2. Create a test harness that enables the testing of any implementations of this class of in-line service.
- 3. Use the abstraction of this class of in-line service to simplify proving network properties.


### A stateless Firewall



NB: Trusted and Dangerous rules do not expire

ACL White list and Black list are defined by the controller. Firewall placement is defined by the controller.

### A stateful Firewall




NB: dynamic rules expire using a timeout value or, for example, on a TCP FIN packet.

ACL White list and Black list are defined by the controller. Firewall placement is defined by the controller.

## A <u>stateful</u> Firewall

#### that ensures no surprises

caveat - we may yet be surprised!



ACL White list and Black list are defined by the controller. Firewall placement is defined by the controller.

For example, this model assumes TCP ACK packets are harmless and allows access both ways. <u>Surprise!</u> ---> this may facilitate data leaks


## **Test Hypothesis**

In-line firewalls may satisfy black box tests while firewalls implemented off-line may fail due to use of off-line state.

#### Expect to see examples of the following in SDN Firewalls;


- Adversaries able to maintain perpetual TCP sessions End hosts believing TCP sessions are finished, while the FW thinks they are open
- Adversaries able to send data packets from internal to external host. Allowing all FIN and ACK packets to exit the internal domain
- Adversaries able to conduct DDOS attacks directly on controller. TCP SYN and/or FIN packets are sent directly to the controller for resolution

# Test Harness



Thank you

### Looking for in-line services



Ranjan etal. 2014. A survey of past present and future of software defined networking. *International Journal.* 




Fig. 1. SDN architecture [11], [23].

Jarraya etal. 2014. A survey and layered taxonomy of software-defined networking. *Communications Surveys and Tutorials, IEEE.* 

Access Firewall IDS/IPS Balancer Control oto Northbound API: OpenDayLight REST, Procera, Frenetic, FML, etc Controller internal services: Path. Security, SAN, etc. Network APIs Maturork Manage Network Control OS Drivers For: L2-L3, OpenFlow, DOVE, etc. Service Abstraction Layer or Network Hypervisors (e.g. FlowVisor) Southbound API: OpenFlow, ForCES, IRS, etc. Data Plane Access Switch vSwitch Router Point Physical Network


Figure 1: SDN Architecture

Alsmadi etal. 2015. Security of software defined networks: A survey. *Computers and Security.* 

Portuge Applications MAC Learning Network Applications MAC Learning Network Applications MAC Learning Network Applications System Coad Balancer SDN controller Untrusion System Coad Balancer

Fig. 5. Traditional networking versus SDN. With SDN, management becomes simpler and middleboxes services can be delivered as SDN controller applications.

Kreutz etal. 2015. Software-defined networking: A comprehensive survey. *Proceedings of the IEEE.* 



Nunes etal. 2014. A survey of software-defined networking: Past present and future of programmable networks. *Communications Surveys and Tutorials, IEEE*>

Finding it in or above the control plane – in 15 recent surveys of SDN research.

## High-end In-line Firewall

Defeats reconnaissance and attack by multiple classes of in-line service working in concert

This talk considers only the Firewall algorithm.

